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A B S T R A C T   
This paper argues that the ability of dominant corporations in the fossil fuel and other polluting industries to 
shape government policy on climate change and energy issues is directly related to their financial interests in 
particular countries, and emblematic of the crippling effect which they have exercised on the ability of nation 
states to decarbonise. Using Australia as an exemplar of the many favourable policy outcomes which powerful 
corporate interests have secured from successive governments in relation to climate and energy policy, it seeks to 
demonstrate that covert networks of political influence have played a major role in the decisions made and 
actions implemented in both areas of policymaking over the last fifteen years. Through detailed empirical 
analysis of a database of current and former senior politicians, political staffers and bureaucrats with employ-
ment links to the fossil fuel and resource extraction industries, it argues that these industries have constructed a 
covert network of lobbyists and revolving door appointments which has ensured that industry interests continue 
to dominate Australia’s energy policy, and that its emissions from fossil fuel use continue to rise. Covert 
corporate influence in Australia’s energy and resource sectors provides an additional layer of explanation for the 
persistence of structural biases in its financing, policy and regulatory regimes to those accounts which draw on 
different forms of discourse and policy analysis.   
1. Introduction 
The maintenance of cheap, easily transportable supplies of fossil 
fuels has been crucial to the global expansion of corporate power, and 
the geopolitical dominance of those countries in which the wealthiest 
corporations are headquartered [1–3]. A handful of public and private 
corporations dominate the oil, coal and gas sectors and electricity supply 
in most of these countries. However, because fossil fuel use is respon-
sible for roughly 60 percent of historic greenhouse gas emissions [4: 
158–159; 5: 36–7; 6] and more than 65 percent of current emissions [7], 
those corporations with significant investments in the extraction, dis-
tribution and consumption of fossil fuels have a strong financial and 
political incentive to undermine global efforts to reduce the carbon in-
tensity of the energy sector. They are primarily dependent for their asset 
values on the future viability of fossil fuels as the world’s primary energy 
source, and have understandably become increasingly preoccupied with 
ensuring that dependency is maintained as threats to their hegemony 
have grown. 
Since the late 1980s, when global attention began to be focused on 
climate change issues, interest coalitions formed by highly capitalized 
fossil fuel and other carbon-intensive businesses and industries have 
actively sought to sow the seeds of confusion with respect to the im-
plications of climate science research, and to oppose any climate or 
energy policy proposals which threaten their incumbency [8–19]. Such 
fossil-fuelled interest coalitions have been most intensively studied in 
the United States and Canada, where their influence has become so 
pervasive they can be characterized as constituting a new social move-
ment. The climate change counter-movement (CCCM) in both countries 
consists of polluting businesses and industries, together with the peak 
bodies, think tanks, publishers, media outlets, politicians, political 
parties, scientists, economists and engineers they have cultivated and 
patronised. The politics of CCCM constituents tend to range from con-
servative to reactionary, while most of its tactics have been borrowed 
from Big Tobacco and the public relations industry [14,20,21]. 
Recent research into the CCCM in the US and Canada has clearly 
revealed the pervasive and disproportionate influence of fossil energy 
and resource corporations on climate change and energy politics in two 
of the world’s most politically and economically powerful developed 
countries [22–28]. This paper contributes to North American CCCM 
research as a comparative study of similar processes in Australia. It also 
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contributes to recent research in science and technology studies, inno-
vation studies and sustainable energy transitions by documenting some 
of the covert strategies used by powerful corporate interests to dominate 
government climate and energy policy, weaken regulatory oversight, 
and entrench their incumbency [29–33]. It builds upon a considerable 
body of research by investigative journalists and environmental and 
social justice advocates for its empirical data. Its theoretical and inter-
pretive schema is derived from the research of scholars in critical po-
litical economy, policy studies, and environmental sociology and 
politics. 
The paper’s central thesis is that covert networks of political influ-
ence have been carefully constructed over many years by the fossil fuel 
and resource extraction industries to further their own political and 
financial interests: for several decades they have largely determined the 
decisions made and actions taken by successive Australian governments 
in relation to climate change and energy policy. These networks of in-
fluence are covert in the sense that they are not officially documented, 
and the individuals involved do not acknowledge their existence. 
However, it is possible to discern their existence and map their activities 
using a range of unconventional sources. The methods developed and 
conclusions drawn in this paper add a structural and instrumental power 
dimension to accounts which draw on different forms of discourse and 
policy analysis. Clearly, covert and other undocumented forms of po-
litical activity cannot be subjected to discursive forms of analysis or any 
form of critical theoretical and methodological inquiry unless those 
activities can somehow be documented or inferred from their outcomes. 
The paper begins therefore with an outline of the broader context of 
bipartisan political support for the further expansion of fossil fuel pro-
duction in Australia, and the policy outcomes which are the conse-
quences of that support. It outlines twenty-four areas of policy- and 
decision-making that indicate the entrenchment of structural biases in 
the financing, policy and regulatory regimes governing fossil fuel use 
and resource extraction in Australia. It seeks to demonstrate that neither 
the shared Promethean narrative of political and economic elites, nor a 
shared government-industry discourse focused on protecting Australia’s 
industrial competitiveness convincingly explain these outcomes 
[34–36]. It argues, to the contrary, that these policy outcomes are strong 
indicators of corporate state capture by the fossil fuel and resource 
extraction industries. Because corporate state capture involves situa-
tions in which ‘private interests subvert legitimate channels of political 
influence and shape the rules of the legislative and institutional game 
through private payments to public officials’[37, cf. 38], it provides a 
plausible working hypothesis to explain these policy outcomes. With 
respect to the kinds of theoretical approaches that can usefully be 
deployed to understand how certain commercial and political interests 
are able to entrench their dominance over governments, rivals and op-
ponents, the paper draws on theories of biased pluralism, economic-elite 
domination, para-politics and capital as power [39–47]. These theoret-
ical approaches arguably provide compelling explanations of the 
otherwise inexplicable policy outcomes we have witnessed in Australia 
over the last three decades with respect to climate change and energy 
policy. 
The methodological approach which the paper develops attempts to 
provide empirical support for the theoretical conclusions drawn. In 
order to demonstrate the breadth and depth of corporate influence on 
government policy- and decision-making with respect to energy and 
climate policy, it combines empirical evidence compiled by fellow re-
searchers on corporate tax avoidance, lobbying, political donations and 
subsidies with my own research on lobbying and revolving door ap-
pointments. It draws on the employment histories and responsibilities of 
160 individuals who have worked or are currently working for both 
government and industry in the fossil energy and resource portfolios 
since 2007. A reasonable inference from this evidence is that a signifi-
cant number of politicians, political staffers and senior bureaucrats have 
enabled the interests of the fossil energy and resource sectors to continue 
to dominate energy policies nationally and in two of the most populous 
states, even though it is clear that the country’s international obligations 
require it to decarbonise by 2050 and the majority of Australians sup-
port that goal. In the absence of juridical procedures which might 
establish that these correlations indicate various levels of causation, it is 
inferred from the evidence presented that major coal, oil and gas cor-
porations operating in Australia have not only increased their efforts 
over the last decade or so to ensure that fossil fuel export and use is 
supported by any elected government for the foreseeable future, they 
have been largely successful in achieving their goals across multiple 
areas of policy- and decision-making. 
2. The policy context: bipartisan support for the expansion of 
Australia’s fossil fuel industry 
Ever since the first Australian colonies were granted self-rule by the 
British government in the mid-nineteenth century, the colonies’ political 
and administrative elites have supported the largely unconstrained 
exploitation of the continent’s diverse and extensive natural resources. 
Soon after Federation in 1901, and especially during the post-War 
period, the country’s mining and fossil energy sectors underwent 
rapid expansion, much of which was financed or underwritten by state 
and federal governments. Bipartisan support for this expansion from 
both the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Coalition of the Liberal 
and National parties was so consistent that the country acquired the 
epithet ‘Quarry Australia’ in the early 1980s [48].1 At the core of this 
political consensus, particularly since the early 1980s, has been a 
commitment from both parties to prevent the introduction of any policy 
measures which ‘have net adverse economic impacts nationally or on 
Australia’s trade competitiveness’ [49, cf. 36]. This commitment has 
become more obvious over the last decade or so as Australian citizens 
and their leaders have been forced to confront the fact that the country’s 
continued reliance on fossil resource extraction to stimulate its economy 
is both contributing to and exacerbating dangerous climate change, 
including the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather 
events throughout the country. 
Growing recognition of the dangers associated with continued fossil 
fuel use has fractured Australia’s long-standing political consensus in 
support of a fossil-fuelled future. As the economics of renewables have 
improved to the point that they are now the cheaper alternative, deep 
rifts have emerged within and between the ALP and the Coalition. For 
the last several years, the installation and running costs for renewables 
have been lower than those of fossil-fuelled incumbents in Australia and 
the majority of its fossil export destinations [50,51]. Tasmania, South 
Australia and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have made signif-
icant inroads into decarbonising their electricity supplies, while more 
than three million Australian households and businesses have installed 
more than 13.4 GW of solar photovoltaic capacity since 2010 [52]. In 
2020, South Australia drew almost 60 percent of its electricity from 
renewables, Tasmania 99 percent, and the ACT, 100 percent. However, 
this only covers around 11 percent of the Australian population. The 
states of New South Wales (NSW), Victoria, Queensland and Western 
Australia (WA) have made far less progress, with Victoria at 28 percent, 
WA at 24 percent, NSW at 21 percent, and Queensland at 17 percent 
[52–54]. 
Although these changes are clearly significant, almost 82% of Aus-
tralia’s domestic emissions are still generated by electricity, stationary 
1 The National Party was formerly known as the Country Party (1913–1975). 
The Liberal and National parties and their predecessors have been in various 
coalitions since the 1920s, and are today described as a ‘centre right’ coalition, 
while the ALP is described as ‘centre left’. Both the Coalition and the ALP have 
implemented neoliberal policies over the last four decades. However, there are 
‘hard right’ (or ‘far right’) factions in all three parties, and their influence 
within those parties has become stronger in recent decades, whether or not the 
individuals involved self-identify as belonging to the relevant factions. 
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energy (excluding electricity), transport and fugitive emissions [55]. 
Australia remains one of the most carbon-intensive economies on earth, 
and will almost certainly fail to meet its current international obliga-
tions to reduce its carbon emissions unless it is able to end the fossil- 
fuelled dominance of its climate and energy policies. More than 96 
percent of the country’s transport fuels and 85 percent of its electricity 
were generated from fossil fuels in 2017 [56: 11–14]. While those fig-
ures have markedly improved for electricity generation over the last few 
years, moving from almost 24% of all electricity coming from renewable 
sources in 2019 to almost 28 percent in 2020 [52], they have not 
improved for transport. Furthermore, despite the growth in the quantity 
of renewable energy being generated, it has had comparatively little 
effect on the overall proportion of Australia’s emissions generated by 
fossil fuels. In 2008, that figure was 72 percent; in 2016–17, it was 71 
percent [57: 62, 56: 8]. Australia’s domestic emissions are due to fall by 
more than 8 percent in 2020 due to COVID [58], but that is still less than 
the level of annual emission reductions currently required by all 
developed countries to meet the Paris Agreement targets for 2030 
[59,60].2 According to energy analyst Hugh Saddler, a 5 percent 
reduction in 2020 transport emissions is attributable to COVID, while 
electricity sourced from fossil fuels fell below 74 percent of total gen-
eration last year, partially due to COVID but more so the increased 
renewable electricity capacity coming online [53]. 
The Federal Government’s own figures nevertheless demonstrate 
that between 1990 and 2018, emissions from fossil electricity generation 
increased by more than 47 percent, and from transport by more than 57 
percent [61]. Prior to the COVID pandemic in December 2019, Aus-
tralia’s transport emissions had increased 63 percent relative to 1990 
levels, its fugitive emissions by 51 percent, its stationary energy emis-
sions (excluding electricity) by 54 percent, and its emissions from in-
dustrial processes and product use by 35 percent. Relative to 1990, its 
total electricity emissions increased by ‘only’ 34 percent due to the rapid 
growth in wind and solar capacity at the state and territory level since 
2016, and the inclusion of the renewable offset in the final figure [62: 8, 
45]. The fact that Australia’s domestic emissions have continued to grow 
over the last three decades is an important sign of the fossil fuel indus-
try’s success in resisting substantive policy changes across multiple 
economic sectors, and is arguably a strong indicator of corporate state 
capture. 
The states and territories with the largest economically exploitable 
coal and gas reserves remain the regions with the largest dependencies 
on fossil fuels for energy consumption and export revenue, i.e. NSW, 
WA, Queensland and the Northern Territory (NT). They have also been 
the slowest to decarbonise, even though they also have excellent 
renewable energy resources and are home to many large businesses that 
support an energy transition [63,64]. However, given the economic 
value of their fossil fuel reserves to the industry, and the rapidity with 
which renewables are displacing their domestic markets for energy 
supply, it is in these jurisdictions that the hegemony of fossil-fuelled 
interests are the most threatened. Consequently, it is in these jurisdic-
tions and at the federal level that the industry has been the most pro-
active in ensuring its interests are maintained. 
One of the areas in which the industry has been particularly proac-
tive is ensuring the maintenance and expansion of a range of direct and 
indirect subsidies from state and federal governments. More than $12 
billion of taxpayer funds flow annually to the industry in direct subsidies 
[65], amounting to more than $70 billion between 2015 and 2021 
(Fig. 1). Estimates of the combined costs of subsidies and the social and 
environmental externalities produced by carbon pollution in Australia 
range from around $18 billion to $39 billion annually in current 
Australian dollars [57: 60, 66: 35]. The financing of fossil fuel infra-
structure and maintenance are two other areas in which state and federal 
governments continue to be involved (Tables 1 and 2). Shortly after the 
Coalition regained power federally in September 2013, it committed 
more than $3 billion in funding for ‘low emission’ projects and fossil fuel 
exploration. It also provided $526 million in public finance to expand 
the country’s coal, oil and gas production, while the WA, NSW and 
Queensland governments provided $2.87 billion over the same two-year 
period in capital injection for state-owned electricity companies and 
port infrastructure [67]. 
The Federal Coalition’s unwavering dedication to subsidising fossil 
fuels became even more apparent in its 2021 Federal Budget. It will 
provide $2 billion to ensure that Australia’s only two remaining oil re-
fineries remain open [68], another $600 million for a new gas-fired 
power station in NSW that the private sector and the national energy 
regulator has rejected as unnecessary [69], $264 million for carbon- 
capture-and-storage (CCS) research, and a further $59 million for new 
gas projects [70]. It is noteworthy that more than $3.5 billion has 
already been committed to CCS technology since 2003, although suc-
cessive governments were only able to spend $1.3 billion of that funding 
up to 2017 due to a lack of projects and support from industry [71]. 
The fact that both the ALP and Coalition have provided billions of 
dollars in subsidies to one of the most profitable industries on Earth, and 
continue to do so, provides a second indicator of corporate state capture. 
Bearing in mind that Australia’s superannuation funds operate under 
investment rules regulated by the Federal Government, those funds also 
continue to invest billions of dollars into fossil fuel projects, despite 
growing calls for disinvestment from members [72]. The industry’s 
success in ensuring it is under no pressure from government regulators 
to minimize its exposure to carbon risk in the face of growing domestic 
and international pressure provides a third indicator of corporate state 
capture. 
Several powerful factions within the ALP and Coalition have 
repeatedly made it clear that they regard any kind of renewable energy 
transition as a threat to the existence of their political and economic 
allegiances with workers in the fossil fuel industry and major corpora-
tions in finance, energy and resources. A number of individuals within 
these factions have consistently sought to undermine any claims that 
fossil-fuelled development is no longer economically, socially or envi-
ronmentally desirable. They continue to support and promote the fossil 
fuel industry’s strategy of locking in as much expansion as possible, as 
quickly as possible, while simultaneously ensuring that it is able to 
minimize its financial and legal obligations to any of the regions and 
populations in which it operates. Consequently, over the last three de-
cades, Australian coal production has tripled while its natural gas pro-
duction has quintupled [56: 8, 13]. Between the early 1980s and the 
early 2010s, Australia was the world’s largest coal exporter, and has 
recently regained that mantle [57,73]. It has also recently overtaken 
Qatar as the world’s largest exporter of natural gas [74,75]. 
Such rapid expansion and market dominance is a fourth indicator of 
corporate state capture by this fossil-fuelled interest coalition, a point 
well-illustrated by the enormous revenues generated by Australian coal 
and gas exports, which are second only to iron ore. The whole sector 
generated almost $115 billion in export revenue from its Australian 
operations in 2019/20, slightly less than the record $132 billion it 
generated in 2018/19. To put these figures into perspective, Australia’s 
GDP in 2019/20 was $1985 billion, indicating that the industry 
contributed around 6 percent of GDP that financial year and around 30 
percent of all export revenue in 2019/20. Over the fifteen year period 
between 2005 and 2020, by far the largest fossil export earner was coal, 
totalling more than $643 billion, with gas generating $287 billion and 
petroleum more than $166 billion over the same period [76]. As a 
percentage of nominal GDP, the last few years have seen record levels of 
coal export revenue, comparable only to the recent boom years from 
2008 to 2012 [57,77]. Export revenues from gas are historically un-
precedented (Fig. 2). 
2 If the current Federal Coalition Government’s dedication to a ‘gas-led re-
covery’ is realized (Murphy 2020a; Foley 2020), it is very unlikely that it will 
even be able to maintain its current inadequate emission reductions targets 
post-COVID. 
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However, if we examine this expansion from a climate risk man-
agement perspective, these developments look far less defensible. Aus-
tralia’s annual contribution to atmospheric GHG emissions rises to 
around 5.5 percent of the global burden if its domestic emissions are 
combined with those from its exports [78]. Given that Australians 
constitute 0.32 percent of the world’s population, its residents might 
only be responsible for 0.25 percent of global emissions (assuming 20 
percent of its domestic emissions are generated by households), but the 
corporate entities located within it are ultimately responsible for pro-
ducing seventeen times more greenhouse gas pollution than Australia’s 
population arguably warrants. 
Another fact which the energy and resource industries are reluctant 
to publicly admit is that they are 86 percent foreign-owned, meaning 
that the vast majority of the mining industry’s annual profits go offshore 
[79]. Even less well known is the fact that the ‘Big Four’ accountancy 
firms, i.e. KPMG, PwC, Deloitte and Ernst & Young have enabled the 
fossil fuel industry to avoid paying tens of billions of dollars in income 
taxes and royalties for publicly-owned fossil fuel resources over many 
years [80–84]. The Big Four are responsible for auditing 98 percent of 
Fig. 1. Australian government direct subsidies paid to the fossil fuel industry, 2015–2021. Source: Market Forces (2020).  
Table 1 
Australian state and federal bodies providing financial support for the fossil fuel industry, 2013–14. Source: Makhijani & Doukas (2014).  
GOVT ENTITY STATE SUPPORT $ AMOUNT 
Fed Dept of Industry, Innovation & Science  
(total budgeted program expend.) 
Low Emission Technologies for Fossil Fuels Program 
Carbon Capture & Storage Flagships Program 
Low Emission Technologies Demonstration Fund 





Geoscience Australia Fossil fuel exploration, esp. offshore reserve development. $33 m 
TOTAL FEDERAL SUPPORT $3013 million 
WA Govt Govt capital injections to state-owned electricity companies $219 m 
QLD Govt Govt capital injections to state-owned electricity companies $256 m 
QLD Govt Govt capital injections to support port infrastructure $2200 m 
NSW Govt Govt capital injections to support port infrastructure (Port Kembla) $197 m 
TOTAL STATE SUPPORT $2872 million  
Table 2 
Australian government public finance for fossil fuel industry projects, 2013 & 
2014. Source: Makhijani & Doukas (2014).  
PUBLIC FINANCE ENTITY 2013 & 2014 
Export Finance & Insurance Corporation (domestic & international) $317 million 
Mutlilateral Development Banks $209 million 
GRAND TOTAL $526 million  
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global corporations with a turnover of US$1 billion or more, and 
reputedly cost governments and taxpayers around the world more than 
US$1 trillion in annual revenue [85]. Between 2012 and 2018, thirteen 
of the Big Four’s largest Australian clients in the coal, oil and gas in-
dustries generated well in excess of $160 billion in Australian revenues, 
but paid less than $12 million in income tax on that revenue, or 0.007 
percent of total revenue.3 By way of contrast, their ten most ‘responsible’ 
resource and energy clients generated $415.4 billion in total revenue 
between 2015 and 2018, and paid $21.1 billion in income tax, or 5 
percent of their total revenue (Tables 3 and 4). The contents of these 
tables and their implications will be examined in more detail in Section 
5. 
The Big Four are notorious for treating conflicts of interest as revenue 
streams. They were paid more than $3.1 billion in consultancy fees by 
the Federal Coalition Government between 2012 and 2018 [86], in lieu 
of the public service expertise which the Coalition has purged from the 
federal bureaucracy over many years as the result of successive waves of 
austerity and ‘rationalization’. It should be noted that this is, however, 
only a small fraction of the $129 billion spent by the Coalition on 
outsourcing consultancy and non-consultancy services to the private 
sector over the five-year period from 2012 to 2017, which has gutted 
public sector service provision [87]. Although they routinely advise 
both corporations and governments regarding tax arrangements, the Big 
Four have been afforded permanent secondment positions in Australian 
government departments. Having effectively infiltrated government on 
behalf of their corporate clients, they have managed to successfully fend 
off all efforts to remove the ‘grandfathering’ of tax concessions for the oil 
and gas industry over many decades. Nevertheless, the many conflicts of 
interest in which the Big Four are involved have never been officially 
investigated or acknowledged [80,86,88–92]. They are, therefore, 
important enablers of the fossil fuel industry’s political and economic 
power, and provide a fifth indicator of corporate state capture. 
A sixth indicator of state capture is the success of Australian nego-
tiators in winning major concessions for Australia under the Kyoto 
Protocol. After several years of intense lobbying, Australia was 
permitted to increase national emissions by 8 percent relative to 1990 
levels, and to use carbon sinks to offset its transport and energy emis-
sions. It is well documented that Australian government representatives 
have acted in concert with other fossil fuel producing and exporting 
nations as industry advocates, and have played a spoiler role in inter-
national diplomacy surrounding action on climate change [93]. During 
Fig. 2. Australia’s fossil fuel export revenue by major category, 2005–2020. Source: DFAT (2021).  
Table 3 
Top resource & energy tax avoiders 2015–2018. Source: Michael West Media 
(2020).   
COMPANY TOTAL REVENUE INCOME TAX PAID 
1 ExxonMobil $33.1 billion $0 
2 Energy Australia $30.2 billion $0 
3 Santos $14.9 billion $3.1 million 
4 Peabody Australia $12.2 billion $0 
5 Chevron Australia $10.5 billion $0 
6 BG International $9.7 billion $0 
7 BNP Paribas SA $9.6 billion $0 
8 Puma Energy $9.4 billion $0 
9 Citic Resources Australia $8.4 billion $0 
10 Sime Darby Industrial Australia $7.5 billion $8.6 million 
11 Yancoal Australia $6.8 billion $0 
12 UGL $6.4 billion $0 
13 Victoria Power Networks $6.1 billion $0  
TOTALS $164.8 billion $11.7 million  
Table 4 
Top resource & energy tax payers 2015–2018. Source: Michael West Media 
(2020).   
COMPANY TOTAL REVENUE INCOME TAX PAID 
1 BHP Billiton $100.2 billion $7 billion 
2 Rio Tinto $92.6 billion $6.8 billion 
3 Woodside Petroleum $21.8 billion $1.2 billion 
4 Shell Energy Holdings $47.5 billion $1.1 billion 
5 Robe River Mining $6.4 billion $1.1 billion 
6 Hancock Prospecting $7.1 billion $1 billion 
7 BP Regional Australia $78.3 billion $0.9 billion 
8 Mitsui Australia $16.9 billion $0.9 billion 
9 Alcoa Australia $11.9 billion $0.6 billion 
10 AGL Energy $32.7 billion $0.5 billion  
TOTALS $415.4 billion $21.1 billion  
3 Unless otherwise stated, all dollar figures provided are in Australian dollars. 
On 4 April 2021, AUD1.00 = USD0.76. 
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the premiership of Liberal leader John Howard, Australia’s negotiating 
team was dominated by fossil fuel and mining interests. A number of 
fossil fuel and mining executives also claimed they had drafted Austra-
lian climate and energy policies during Howard’s term in office [10,11]. 
Australia was only able to meet its Kyoto Protocol target between 2008 
and 2012 by offsetting its higher emissions from electricity, transport 
and industrial processes with reductions in its emissions from land 
clearing, forestry and waste disposal [12: 24, [57]: 62]. Subsequent to 
signing the Paris Agreement in 2015, the Federal Coalition Government 
is yet to endorse any policies that will achieve the emission reductions to 
which it has committed [7,94,95]. 
It is nevertheless important to point out that the ALP is far from 
blameless with respect to ensuring the continued incumbency of the 
fossil fuel industry in providing for Australia’s transport and energy 
needs. Although several Labor state and territory governments have 
implemented policies to increase the proportion of renewable electricity 
generation within their own jurisdictions [96], and several Federal 
Labor senators have supported the phase out of coal-fired power stations 
[97, cf. 98,99], the ALP continues to oppose any suggestion that thermal 
coal mining should be phased out [100,101, cf. 57], and continues to 
support further expansion of the industry [102]. It has also remained 
silent on the issue of breaking up the vertically-integrated oligopolies 
that successive governments have enabled and which continue price- 
gouging retail customers in electricity generation and transmission 
[103–110]. It has likewise had nothing to say regarding the cartel that 
has emerged in gas production and supply which it helped to establish 
over the last decade [111–114]. Although it has recently announced a 
revamped electric vehicle policy [115], it does not appear to have any 
policies on improving vehicle emission standards, despite transport 
sector emissions continuing to grow since the early 1990s [116]. It has 
also shown no willingness to address the regulatory capture of some of 
the agencies charged with public oversight of the energy and resource 
sectors [106,117–120, cf. 121 on similar problems in the UK], and has 
made no concrete commitment to decarbonise the whole economy, or to 
provide for a just transition for fossil fuel workers [35,122–124]. 
Because the Coalition has been similarly reluctant to act on any of these 
issues, which constitute at least seven other policy areas in which the 
fossil fuel industry has been successful in achieving its goals, the number 
of indicators of corporate state capture rises to thirteen. 
Apart from these thirteen policy areas, it has been widely reported 
that the fossil fuel and resource extraction industries have managed to 
successfully repeal a national price on carbon, prevented the introduc-
tion of policies promoting electric vehicles, demonized efforts to phase 
out coal exports, and overcome state-wide moratoria on coal seam gas 
extraction. They have also been instrumental in weakening environ-
mental regulations, strengthening anti-protest laws, and ensuring the 
removal of two insufficiently compliant prime ministers, i.e. Kevin Rudd 
(ALP) and Malcolm Turnbull (Coalition) [125–129]. Despite having 
ample warning that it needed to act, the Federal Government allowed 
Shell and Caltex/Mobil to close most of their remaining oil refineries in 
Australia, with the result that the country now has a dangerously 
inadequate strategic petroleum reserve which is reliant on US reserves 
for support [130,131]. Both state and federal governments have failed to 
legislate for any kind of domestic gas reserve, and allowed virtually all of 
the country’s massively increased gas production to be exported, leading 
to similarly massive price rises in the cost of domestic gas for all con-
sumers [132,112,133]. The industry has also been granted legal ex-
emptions on environmental controls, including for its profligate use and 
pollution of scarce water resources, and burning gas flares during 
intense fire conditions [134,135]. These constitute another eleven in-
dicators of corporate state capture, bringing the total to twenty-four 
(Table 5). 
Important elements of how the industry achieved these goals are 
neither public nor scrutable. While deep divisions over climate and 
energy policy undoubtedly exist within and between factions in Aus-
tralia’s major political parties, those divisions do not explain their 
Table 5 
Indicators of state capture by the fossil fuel industry in Australia.  
Indicator Jurisdiction Bipartisan 
(Y/N) 
Increases of 34–63 percent in emissions from 
energy, transport & industry from 1990 to 
2020. 
State & Federal Y 
Maintenance & expansion of fossil fuel 





No regulation of carbon risk in the 
superannuation industry. 
Federal Y 
Tripling of coal production and quintupling 
of gas production since 1990. 
Federal, NSW, 
Qld, WA, NT 
Y 
No action on conflicts of interest for Big Four 
accountancy firms and their enabling of 
tax avoidance by major fossil fuel firms. 
Federal Y 
Major concessions won under Kyoto 
Protocol to increase emissions by 8% on 
1990 levels and include carbon sinks for 
emission mitigation. 
Federal Y 
No policies on phasing out thermal coal or 
gas production. 
State & Federal Y 
No effort to break up vertically-integrated 
oligopolies in electricity generation and 
retailing. 
State & Federal Y 
No effort to break up the cartel in Australian 
gas production. 
Federal Y 
No policy on improving vehicle fuel 
efficiency standards. 
Federal Y10 
No effort to address regulatory capture of 
key government agencies in the energy & 
resource sectors. 
State & Federal Y 
No commitment or plan to decarbonise the 
whole economy. 
State & Federal Y 
No plan for a just transition for coal workers. State & Federal Y11 
Repeal of a national price on carbon by the 
Coalition. 
Federal N 
No coherent national or state-based policies 
on electric vehicles. 
State & Federal Y12 
No policy on reducing coal exports. State & Federal Y 
Abolition of state-wide moratoria on coal 
seam gas extraction. 
NSW, WA, NT Y 
Weakening of environmental regulations for 
fossil fuel projects. 
Federal, NSW, 
WA, Qld, NT 
Y 
Strengthening of anti-protest laws to curb 
environmental activism. 
Federal, NSW, Qld Y 
Removal from office of two insufficiently 
fossil-friendly prime ministers. 
Federal Y 
Enabled closure of strategic oil refineries by 
oil majors. 
Federal Y 
A dangerously inadequate strategic 
petroleum reserve. 
Federal Y 
No domestic gas reserve. Federal, NSW, 
WA, Qld, NT 
Y 
Exemption of fossil fuel projects from 
environmental regulations. 
Federal, WA, 
NSW, Qld, NT 
Y  
10 It should be noted, however, that the most recent Federal Budget measure 
providing $2 billion in support for the country’s two remaining oil refineries 
includes $300 million for infrastructure upgrades to improve fuel quality to 
‘world’s best practice’ by 2024. There remains no policy to improve vehicle fuel 
efficiency standards. 
11 The ALP claims to have a policy on a just transition for coal workers but it is 
impossible to locate and is never publicly discussed. 
12 Several Coalition and ALP-governed states have recently introduced EV- 
related legislation, but it is neither coherent nor national in remit. 
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seeming inability to acknowledge or recognize the need for significant 
institutional reform of the electricity and transport sectors, or reforms to 
the ways in which taxes and royalties are collected from major coal, gas 
and oil projects. The major parties have repeatedly failed to act when 
clear instances of malfeasance and illegal behaviour by energy and 
mining companies have been exposed, including widespread tax 
avoidance [81–83,88,136–139]. Such behaviour is not convincingly 
explained by shared ideological preferences or development narratives. 
Similarly, although some fossil energy and resource firms have publicly 
endorsed action on climate change, or removed themselves from peak 
industry bodies that were openly engaged in climate change denial, 
behind the scenes many of those same companies have continued 
funding efforts to undermine decarbonisation, including ExxonMobil, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, BP, Total and Woodside, all of which have 
major stakes in oil and gas projects in Australia [140–142]. All of these 
companies have also been engaged in aggressive tax avoidance (Tables 3 
and 4; 143). As we will see in Section 4 of this paper, they have also 
made large donations to the major political parties, employ an army of 
lobbyists to court them, and regularly employ senior public officials 
from key government portfolios, while simultaneously implanting their 
own operatives in those portfolios. 
3. Theorizing the social power of covert networks in Australia’s 
energy and resource sectors 
The definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power. 
E.E. Schattschneider (1960): 68. 
In a landmark empirical study that examined the voting patterns of 
incumbent politicians in the United States, Martin Gilens and Benjamin 
Page demonstrated that the policy and voting preferences of US politi-
cians correlate strongly with those of business and industrial elites, and 
very weakly or not at all with those of the general public, except in cases 
where the preferences of elites and publics align [144]. Drawing on a 
large and diverse set of almost 1779 policy cases between 1981 and 
2002 their findings strongly support political theories of economic-elite 
domination and biased pluralism, as opposed to theories of majoritarian 
electoral democracy and majoritarian pluralism. According to biased 
pluralism theories, the interests of corporations, business associations 
and professional groups tend to predominate over those of the ‘average 
citizen’ and mass-based interest groups, particularly when the scope of 
conflict is narrow and public visibility is low [39–43,145]. According to 
elite domination theories, individuals with high social status occupying 
key institutional positions in government, business, industry and the 
military have common interests, backgrounds and social networks [42]. 
Those individuals who form economic elites by dint of their high in-
comes and wealth work through foundations, think-tanks and other 
‘opinion-shaping apparatus’, together with the politicians and lobbyists 
they finance, to dominate government decision-making, despite the 
existence of democratic electoral processes [43]. Both theoretical ap-
proaches indicate that a combination of structural biases in the in-
stitutions of government and various forms of ‘soft corruption’ provide 
more convincing explanations of why such preferences find such 
consistent political expression than theories which rely solely on the 
productive power of ideologies [146–148] or discourses [35,36]. 
There are a number of ongoing research projects in the US, UK, 
Australia and Canada documenting the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon in 
a number of different sectors [e.g. [65,140,149–152]. A number of 
recent studies have focused upon networks of corporate influence in the 
fossil fuel and resource extraction industries, building and construction, 
finance and banking, transport and logistics, gaming and racing, health 
and aged care, pharmaceuticals, defense and telecommunications 
[153–159]. However, with the exceptions of recent global studies by 
Australian-based researchers [160–162] and the pioneering in-
vestigations of Clive Hamilton, Guy Pearse, and several other scholars 
with a journalistic background [9–12,163–168], questions of market 
power and corporate influence in relation to climate change and energy 
policy in Australia do not generally inform the academic literature and 
therefore remain under-theorized. 
The ‘capital as power’ (CaP) theoretical framework developed by 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler provides an overarching 
framework for conceptualizing the political economy of contemporary 
capitalist societies and their dependence on fossil energy which can 
accommodate theories of economic-elite domination and biased 
pluralism [44]. CaP is also able to explain why the governments of 
nation states habitually favour the interests of global corporations in 
their efforts to make and control markets [2,169]. Drawing on the 
institutionalist tradition in political economy founded by Thorstein 
Veblen, CaP argues that since the emergence of industrial capitalism, 
financialization has become the standard method used by powerful 
corporations to achieve and maintain political and economic dominance 
across multiple sectors and jurisdictions. In order for these corporations 
to maintain their dominance, it is essential that the political elites of the 
nation states in which those corporations are headquartered, or from 
which they derive significant revenues, maintain the perception that 
those corporations’ activities are legitimate, and that their future prof-
itability is assured [1,161]. Those who comply are rewarded with 
generous political donations and lucrative post-parliamentary careers. 
Those who do not are opposed, rendered ineffective through whatever 
means are necessary, and ultimately removed from office. It follows 
from this that expert advice to decision-makers in both the public and 
private sectors, no matter from where it originates, will always be sub-
servient to dominant financial interests should that advice not prove 
consistent with maintaining favourable perceptions of their future 
ability to earn more than the average rate of investment return. 
According to Nitzan and Bichler, the power of capital lies not in its 
ability to produce, but in its ability to incapacitate, i.e. the power to 
sabotage [44: 231]. In their view, ‘capital income depends not on the 
growth of industry, but on the strategic control of industry’ [44: 322]. 
Monetary accumulation is both the goal and the means of gaining 
financial success, while capitalization is the tool for assigning values to 
fortunes, which are in turn based on expected earnings discounted 
against the probability that those earnings will not be realized [44: 262]. 
They argue that dominant capital seeks to ‘shape and restructure the 
course of social reproduction at large’ within a broader framework of 
social struggle between capitalist elites, and between capitalists and 
labour. This power struggle is characterized by attempts to accumulate 
the ability to subjugate creativity to power [44: 218]. Thus, the con-
centration of social power in the hands of ruling elites is a function of 
their ability to craft policy and regulatory regimes, appropriate the 
creativity of others, sabotage the efforts of competitors and rivals, and 
concentrate wealth and income in their own hands. It follows from this 
that the most powerful elites in our societies are those whose income- 
generating assets are the most highly financialized, which includes the 
publicly-listed, privately-owned and state-run fossil fuel companies. 
Political economist John Mikler points out that only 10 percent of the 
world’s public companies are responsible for generating 80 percent of 
global profits. The largest of those companies, i.e. those with more than 
US$1 billion in annual revenue, generate 60 percent of global revenues 
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and 65 percent of global market capitalization. Because it is not at all 
unusual for only four global corporations to control 40 percent or more 
of total revenue in major industrial sectors, those corporations are able 
to punish or reward nation states and regional governments for the 
provision of favourable investment conditions [162: 40–41]. In 
Australia, such oligopolies exist in the oil, coal and gas industries, 
electricity generation, aviation, banking and finance, transport and lo-
gistics, mining and resources, and metals processing, i.e. all of those 
industries responsible for greenhouse gas pollution and the financing of 
those industries’ activities. For Nitzan and Bichler, their level of market 
capitalization determines the extent to which they are able to shape 
national and international legislative and regulatory regimes. High 
levels of market capitalization enable corporations to make and control 
global markets through their exercise of structural, instrumental and 
discursive forms of power [162: 40–45]. The following discussion fo-
cuses on the structural and instrumental forms of power exercised by the 
fossil fuel and resource extraction industries, which are then explicated 
through the empirical analysis in Section 5. 
Following Nitzan and Bichler’s reasoning, the ability of dominant 
corporations to shape government policy is directly correlated to the 
level of their financial investments in that country, and whether those 
investments are in critical economic sectors, both of which give them 
structural power to shape market conditions in their favour. Structural 
power encompasses all those activities which enable political actors to 
set agendas by ‘creating or reinforcing social and political values and 
institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to 
public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively 
innocuous’ to them [170]. The quote above from Schattschneider refers 
to a key feature of structural power: the power to define the alternatives. 
In the context of this discussion, it implies that the more significant the 
financial interest of a corporation or industry peak body in a critical 
sector, the greater its preparedness and ability to exercise its political 
and economic power over governments and civil society. This can 
include offers of investment and threats of disinvestment in a country, 
region or city, or determining what are acceptable and unacceptable 
forms of economic interaction. When the financial interests of corpo-
rations coalesce, collective action enables them to realize their goals 
more easily. Cooperation and coordination are more likely to occur 
when they are faced with a common threat. In those cases where there is 
oligopolistic domination of a sector by several large firms, cooperation 
enables them to pool their resources and thereby reduce the costs of 
neutralizing that threat. All of these things are, of course, true of the 
fossil fuel, electricity and resource extraction industries. 
The ability of dominant corporations’ to shape relevant policy and 
regulatory regimes in their favour also occurs through various forms of 
instrumental power. These constitute forms of direct influence whereby 
one actor exercises leverage over another actor in order to achieve an 
instrumentally motivated outcome that the second actor would not 
otherwise pursue [171]. Traditional realist accounts of international 
relations assume we live in an anarchic world in which instrumental 
power is exercised through various forms of coercion by one nation state 
over another that in turn creates imbalances of power that produce 
conflict or stability [162: 35]. It is very clear that corporations now play 
a significant role in inter- and intranational relations, exercising their 
instrumental power over one another and the nation states in which they 
operate through public relations campaigns, lobbying, political dona-
tions and revolving door appointments. Business in general and corpo-
rations in particular have greatly expanded their activities in all four 
areas since the early 1970s [172]. Such practices are now common in 
most countries, particularly in those parts of the economy where sig-
nificant amounts of revenue are routinely generated and expended. 
Corporations involved in economic activities that are highly regulated 
tend to invest more resources pursuing these strategies, which is true of 
the fossil fuel, electricity and resource extraction industries [173]. 
Lobbying is one of the oldest forms of instrumental power exercised 
by the wealthy and influential. In recent decades it has become a multi- 
billion dollar business, with hundreds of thousands of lobbyists working 
in thousands of firms throughout the world regularly exerting pressure 
on governments to do their bidding. There is ample evidence to indicate 
that these efforts are extremely effective. One US study published in 
2009 found a 22,000 percent return on investment for every $1 spent on 
tax lobbying, and that the larger the industry and firm size, the greater 
the return [174]. Political donations buy access to parliamentarians and 
to favourable political outcomes. They also establish personal relation-
ships between the donor and the donee, which are often cultivated over 
many years and facilitate revolving door appointments between the 
donating firm and governing bodies, as well as post-political career 
pathways for compliant politicians, political staffers and senior bu-
reaucrats. Major corporations expend considerable time and resources 
courting individuals who hold public office in relevant portfolios as 
potential allies and future employees, sometimes as lobbyists, some-
times as advisors, sometimes as consultants, and other times as board 
members and company directors. By implanting their own current and 
former staff members in the positions of political staffers and the senior 
echelons of relevant bureaucracies, they are even more powerfully 
enabled to achieve their goals. It is important to note that to the extent 
that any of these strategies remain undocumented, they constitute 
covert forms of influence. The resulting social networks are thus far 
more powerful than any advocacy coalition, and less amenable to any 
form of public scrutiny than a discourse coalition. It is therefore rela-
tively straightforward in most circumstances for opponents of gover-
nance reform to discredit claims of covert corporate influence if there is 
no ‘smoking gun’ directly linking corporate interests to certain gov-
ernment decisions. 
In the context of policy and regulation, the use of both structural and 
instrumental forms of power through sabotage can best be practiced 
covertly through undisclosed political donations, undocumented 
lobbying practices, and concealed business relationships involving 
conflicts of interest. Two useful terms for characterizing the kinds of 
covert forms of political activity that characterize strategies of sabotage 
were coined by the Canadian diplomat and academic Peter Dale Scott. In 
his examination of the covert networks linking the illicit narcotics trade, 
the petroleum industry, and the US war machine, he coined the term 
‘deep politics’ to refer to ‘all those political practices and arrangements, 
deliberate or not, which are usually repressed rather than acknowl-
edged’, and ‘para-politics’ to denote conduct carried out through ‘indi-
rection, collusion and deceit’ (45, 46, cf. 26, 47). Although Scott 
developed these terms to describe covert links between mainstream 
politicians, fossil fuel and finance companies, military and intelligence 
agencies, and organized crime in the United States, these terms are 
equally applicable to the anti-democratic networks of covert influence 
currently operating between industry, politics and the media in 
Australia. Indeed, many of the Australian networks documented in 
Section 4 of this paper include US-headquartered fossil fuel corporations 
previously implicated by Scott and other credible sources in illicit ac-
tivities which have so far escaped prosecution. 
The kinds of para-political activities that occur in Australia take 
place through social connections between individuals working in and for 
departments, agencies and other quasi-autonomous bodies within cor-
porations, governments, political parties, peak organizations, and public 
relations and consultancy firms. Economists Cameron Murray and Paul 
Frijters have described these insider networks as a ‘game of mates’, 
wherein rent-seeking by business and industry is focused on gaining 
privileged access to decision-makers, resulting in billions of dollars 
being siphoned off annually from government coffers to line the pockets 
of ‘mates’ in the mining, finance, transport, property and other in-
dustries [158]. The ‘game of mates’ is played so well in Australia that 63 
percent of its billionaires have attained their wealth through political 
connections, in much the same manner as India and Colombia, as 
opposed to 1 percent in the United States [175]. More than 80 percent of 
Australia’s richest 200 Australians have made their fortunes in property, 
mining, banking, superannuation and finance, all of which are heavily 
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regulated sectors in which enormous fortunes can be made through 
favourable planning, legal and regulatory exemptions, concessions and 
subsidies [176]. 
With respect to the fossil fuel and resource industries in Australia, 
former Liberal Party staffer Guy Pearse was the first to systematically 
document such activities in his doctoral thesis [177], and his book and 
later essay based on that thesis [11,12]. Pearse’s research revealed the 
extent to which polluting industries operating in Australia engaged in 
deep politics to capture the ruling Liberal and National parties at the 
federal level under Prime Minister John Howard. Pearse also intimated 
on several occasions that these covert relationships go deeper and 
further back in time to encompass the activities of previous federal Labor 
governments. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that neither the 
Coalition nor Labor has shown any appetite to further investigate any of 
Pearse’s findings. Polluting industries have carefully constructed and 
cultivated personal relationships with senior officials in the major po-
litical parties and key bureaucracies over many decades. These are deep 
political relationships which are not dependent on the reliability and 
availability of particular individuals. 
4. Developing a methodology for investigating covert networks 
of political influence 
The methodology adopted in the next section of the paper involves 
using investigative and quantitative techniques combined with social 
network analysis. The research which informs it began with a search of 
more than 250 news reports discussing political donations, revolving 
door and lobbying activities in the Australian energy and resource sec-
tors covering the period from 2007 to 2021 [Table 6]. These reports 
were located by conducting a series of systematic searches of twenty-two 
relevant websites, including one government anti-corruption agency, 
ten newspapers,4 one government-funded news service, seven inde-
pendent media sites, and three NGOs. The initial searches included the 
compilation of almost 2000 reports relating to a series of corruption 
findings against several ALP and Coalition parliamentarians in NSW 
over coal and gas licenses in the late 2000s. The latter reports are 
itemized in the right hand column of Table 6. Although they clearly 
indicate the high level of attention to these issues by the mainstream 
media, it is the independent media that has more consistently focused on 
stories about revolving door appointments, lobbying and political do-
nations related to the fossil fuel industry, as captured in the central 
column of Table 6. 
Of the 251 reports listed in the central column, around 60 contained 
information pertaining to current or former senior politicians, political 
staffers and bureaucrats who currently or formerly held key positions in 
the energy and resource portfolios and who had also previously or 
subsequently worked for a fossil energy, electricity or resource company 
or industry peak body. The relevant articles were revealed by doing 
more detailed searches combining one of the terms ‘fossil fuels’, ‘elec-
tricity’, ‘coal’, ‘gas’, ‘petroleum’ and ‘mining’ with one or more of the 
keywords ‘lobby’, ‘revolving door’, ‘donations’, ‘campaign financing’, 
‘gifts’, ‘incentive’, ‘bribery’, ‘corrupt’, ‘illegal’ and ‘public relations’. 
The focus was upon stories that drew attention to the movements of 
these individuals from the public to private sector, or vice versa, and the 
kinds of responsibilities, policies and projects in which they had been 
involved. Most were written by staff writers who had a history of 
covering climate and energy policy issues [e.g. 178–187. Some of the 
stories related to state-based individuals, although most covered state 
and federal politics or federal politics exclusively. 
Several attempts at systematizing these reports had previously been 
made by GetUp!, the Australian Greens, the Australian Conservation 
Foundation (ACF) and The Australia Institute (TAI) [e.g. 188,189. After 
making contact with these other organizations, databases were 
exchanged and a comparison and consolidation of the various sources 
into a single database was begun. The resulting database was then split 
into two sections:  
a) Former Australian politicians with employment links to fossil fuel 
and resource extraction industries  
b) Australian political staffers and senior bureaucrats with employment 
links to fossil fuel and resource extraction industries.5 
Both databases contain details of the career movements and portfolio 
responsibilities of the individuals concerned, their party political affili-
ations (if any), and the periods during which they were employed in the 
various public and private positions which they occupied. The infor-
mation contained in both databases was fact-checked and more detailed 
information entered about the documented individuals, including the 
months they had started or left employment. Employment histories were 
checked using several sources. Parliamentary websites and official 
Wikipedia pages were searched and cross-checked for details of politi-
cians’ terms in office and official positions. LinkedIn and corporate 
websites were searched for the employment histories of political staffers 
Table 6 
Reports published by multiple sources on revolving door, lobbying and political 
donations relating to Australia’s fossil energy sector, Jan 2007 – Mar 2021.  
Information Source Reports of revolving door, 
lobbying & political 
donations related to fossil 
energy (excl. ICAC NSW) 
Reports on ICAC inquiries 
into NSW politicians 













The Advertiser 2 259 




The Daily Telegraph 2 259 




Newcastle Herald 3 187 
news.com.au – 107 
9news.com.au 3 125 
The Sydney Morning 
Herald 
28 61 
Sub-Total 99 1670 
Independent Media 
Australian Mining 7 41 
Crikey! 11 83 
Green Left Weekly 16 32 
Independent Australia 35 58 
Michael West Media 46 10 
New Matilda 7 16 
RenewEconomy 7 – 
The Saturday Paper 13 23 
Sub-Total 142 263 
NGOs 
The Australia Institute 8 – 




TOTAL 251 1932  
4 Five of these are owned by Rupert Murdoch’s NewsCorp, including The 
Australian and news.com.au, with three simply reproducing the same stories 
across multiple mastheads, i.e. The Advertiser, The Courier Mail, and The Daily 
Telegraph, as can be seen in the right hand column of Table 6.  
5 My use of the term ‘fossil fuel industry’ from henceforth includes companies 
and peak bodies involved in fossil-fuelled electricity generation. 
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and senior bureaucrats who had worked in the private sector. State and 
federal lobbyist websites and registers in those Australian jurisdictions 
involved in fossil fuel extraction were also searched to gain some idea of 
how many consultancies and lobbyists were involved, and what kinds of 
issues they were primarily focused upon.6 
A primary limitation of this methodology is the difficulty of locating 
publicly available information pertaining to the identities of political 
staffers working for politicians. It is therefore not always possible to 
determine who is working for whom. A second limitation is that some of 
the relevant politicians, staffers, lobbyists, bureaucrats and advisors are 
unwilling to publicly reveal the full extent of their employment activities 
and positions. Some of those being scrutinized via LinkedIn either 
improved or deleted their public profiles when it became apparent to 
them they were being monitored. A third limitation is that most of the 
lobbyist registers do not contain information about meeting dates, who 
was lobbied, or the topics discussed. Nevertheless, some additional in-
formation can be found through searches of official state and federal 
government websites, as well as corporate web pages and media releases 
from the many companies for whom the various individuals subse-
quently worked or consulted. Because there is a large amount of infor-
mation about the employment histories of these individuals on the 
Internet, there were relatively few individuals whose details could not 
be revealed using these techniques. 
In the next section, the two databases are used to create a number of 
charts and social network diagrams to graphically illustrate:  
a) the positions occupied by, and relationships between, political 
staffers, senior bureaucrats and politicians, and the lobbying, con-
sultancy, fossil energy and electricity firms and peak industry bodies 
for whom they previously or subsequently worked, including the 
jurisdictions in which they primarily operated, and  
b) how those relationships correlate with known political donations 
and lobbying expenditure and tax avoided by the most prominent 
fossil energy firms and peak bodies documented. 
More detailed research combining timelines of the employment 
histories of persons of interest and the introduction and approval of key 
enabling legislation in the interests of major corporate donors and pa-
trons, as well as the blocking or amendment of such legislation, is 
currently underway and will appear in a subsequent research paper. It 
will also detail any major policy or infrastructure concessions occurring 
during the employment histories of key personnel. 
5. Connecting covert networks to lobbying, donations and the 
revolving door in energy policy 
The lack of regulation and transparency relating to political dona-
tions, lobbying and ‘jobs for the boys’ in Australia presents ample op-
portunities for structural biases which enable ‘soft corruption’ in 
government decision-making: a ‘game of mates’ for those with the right 
connections who make their own rules to the detriment of everyone else 
[158]. In this section, I draw upon the two databases described above 
containing the governance and employment histories of 160 former 
Australian politicians, bureaucrats and political staffers with clear 
employment links to the fossil fuel and resource extraction industries 
over the last fourteen years. More than 40 individuals in the database 
could not be definitively identified in this manner and so have been 
excluded from the analysis. The two databases include former Labor, 
Liberal and National party ministers and their staffers, as well as senior 
bureaucrats, some of whom were or are directly employed as advisors, 
consultants and executives by fossil energy companies and peak bodies, 
while others are employed by lobbying firms and PR companies to 
promote the value of the industry to politicians across the political 
spectrum [167,190]. Guy Pearse has documented how polluting in-
dustry executives openly boasted about crafting and drafting climate 
change and energy policies under the Howard Coalition Government 
[11: 228–238, [12]: 31–45]. Because I have not attempted to secure 
confessions of this kind for the purposes of my own research, the analysis 
to follow focuses on the government secondment of industry operatives 
as political staffers and bureaucrats, and the employment by industry 
players of former senior bureaucrats, political staffers and ministers who 
demonstrated their loyalty and commitment while in public office. With 
regard to the career movements of senior politicians, I have previously 
described this phenomenon as a ‘golden escalator’ rather than a 
‘revolving door’, because it rarely involves ‘backwards and forwards’ 
movements between the public and private sectors, in contrast to the 
many ministerial staffers who do so with dizzying regularity [190]. 
In order to demonstrate how fossil-fuelled interests continue to win a 
wide range of political favours from state and federal governments, and 
that corporate state capture of the country’s incumbent political parties 
by the fossil fuel and resource extraction industries is a plausible 
explanatory hypothesis, the discussion to follow focuses on discernible 
financial and employment relationships between individuals and orga-
nizations, including political parties, bureaucracies, corporations and 
industry peak bodies via lobbying, political donations and ‘jobs for the 
boys’. While these various activities are expressions of the instrumental 
power of the corporations concerned, they enable them to exercise 
structural power with respect to determining the shape of government 
policy and decision-making. Through these para-political relationships, 
which remain largely invisible to the public, they are able to sabotage 
any efforts to shift the political and economic agenda of Australia’s 
major political parties. The extensive employment relationships be-
tween the individuals and entities concerned are documented in graphic 
representations of the data pertaining to political party affiliations, 
portfolio responsibilities and pre- and post-political employment. I then 
correlate these data with the levels of disclosed and undisclosed political 
donations and lobbying expenditure from the same companies 
employing former public officials, and the tax concessions which those 
companies and sectors have received. 
Of the 38 current and former politicians with employment links to 
the fossil fuel industry, 20 are or were Liberal politicians, 13 were Labor 
politicians, and five are or were National politicians (Fig. 3). These 
figures demonstrate that Coalition politicians are twice as likely as ALP 
politicians to have pre- or post-political links to the fossil fuel industry. 
As we will see below, this is also generally reflected in the levels of 
political donations flowing to the ALP and Coalition from the fossil fuel 
and resource extraction industries. Furthermore, almost twice as many 
of the politicians identified served as federal members of parliament or 
senators, as opposed to those who built their careers in the states and 
territories, indicating that both industries see far more value in courting 
federal politicians (Fig. 4). The database contains no current or former 
politicians from Tasmania or the Northern Territory, reflecting Tasma-
nia’s low fossil resource base and the Federal Government’s control of 
the rapidly expanding coal seam gas industry in the NT. It is worth 
briefly noting that there are 76 senators and 151 members of the House 
of Representatives in Australia’s current federal parliament. Of the 24 
federal politicians in the database, 16 were MPs and eight were or are 
senators, or about 10 percent of each group, all of whom occupied key 
portfolios related to energy and resources. A senator’s single term is 
eight years, and an MP’s term generally three or four years. There are no 
6 For registers of lobbyists kept by the Australian, NSW, Qld, WA, Vic, SA and 
Tas governments, see: https://lobbyists.ag.gov.au/register; https://lobbyists.el 
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overall term limits in any Australian jurisdiction. 
With regard to the ministerial positions occupied that had the most 
significant material bearing on the fortunes of the fossil fuel industry, 
only three of the 38 politicians in the database did not serve in minis-
terial positions. Three of the Liberal politicians served at both a federal 
and state level. The positions and/or portfolio areas in which the other 
35 served are represented in Figs. 5 and 6. Because a number of the 
politicians concerned fulfilled multiple ministerial roles, the total 
number of positions exceeds the total number of politicians. Also, min-
isterial portfolios relevant to the analysis are often combined, so these 
are counted separately. It is clear from Fig. 5 that federal ministers for 
resources, energy, industry and trade were the most in demand, filling 
23 of the 38 positions documented (60%). Two leaders of the National 
Party (who always fill the role of deputy prime minister when the 
Coalition is in power) and five treasurers and assistant treasurers bring 
the total representation of these highly influential portfolios to 74 
percent of the total. It is likewise clear from Fig. 6 that, at the state and 
territory level, ministers of state and regional development, along with 
premiers, deputy premiers and ministers for energy, industry and trade, 
are the favoured portfolios, at 70 percent of the total. Given the key roles 
of the portfolios concerned, the seniority of the politicians who occupied 
the relevant ministerial positions, and the length of time they were in 
those positions, industry insiders undoubtedly perceived them as valu-
able assets to acquire for their knowledge and social connections. 
With regard to the kinds of private sector positions that these poli-
ticians occupied in fossil-fuelled industries (all but one after retirement), 
Fig. 3. Party political affiliations of 38 current and former ALP & Coalition politicians with employment links to the fossil fuel industry.  
Fig. 4. State, territory and federal jurisdictions in which 38 politicians served with fossil fuel employment relations.  
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the majority are corporate board positions, followed by lobbying roles 
and a handful of consultancies. These are represented in Fig. 7. Again, 
because many of the politicians concerned have occupied more than one 
such position, the total numbers exceed the number of politicians. The 
38 politicians in the database have occupied five positions as consul-
tants, 27 positions for lobbying companies, and 37 positions as company 
directors and chairs: an average of almost two per person. Six of the 38 
were founding members of lobbying firms. The fossil fuel companies and 
peak industry bodies for which they filled board positions are repre-
sented in Fig. 8. Twenty-four of the executive positions they occupied 
were with 18 entities: 15 fossil fuel companies and three peak industry 
bodies. Nine of these companies predominantly traded in coal, two in 
gas and two in oil. Only four of these entities recruited more than one 
politician on their boards, all of whom were former senior ministers. The 
entities concerned were Guildford Coal, Whitehaven Coal, Woodside 
Petroleum and the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration 
Association (APPEA). The nine lobbying firms which have employed or 
been founded by former politicians are represented in Fig. 9. 
Turning now to an analysis of the 119 political staffers and senior 
bureaucrats in the second database, we see there are 47 Liberal staffers, 
five LNP staffers,7 seven Nationals staffers and 37 Labor staffers, as well 
as 23 staffers of indeterminate political allegiance [Fig. 10]. The criteria 
for associating these individuals with particular political parties were if 
they had served in some official party capacity, and/or if they had 
Fig. 5. Ministerial positions of federal politicians with fossil fuel employment relations.  
Fig. 6. Ministerial positions of state & territory politicians with fossil fuel employment relations.  
7 The LNP is the coalition of the Liberal and National parties, which only 
exists in Queensland. 
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worked as staffers for only the Coalition or Labor. Once again, we can 
see that the number of Coalition staffers with employment links to the 
fossil fuel industry is almost twice that of Labor staffers. Fig. 11 shows 
the jurisdictions in which the Coalition staffers and bureaucrats were 
employed. Fig. 12 shows the jurisdictions in which the Labor staffers and 
bureaucrats were employed. In both cases, most of the individuals 
concerned acted in multiple positions, and many served in more than 
one jurisdiction. In both cases, the vast majority of these people worked 
for the Federal Government, but many of them had also worked in NSW 
and Queensland, the richest states for fossil fuel resources. Only a 
handful had worked in other states or territories. 
Figs. 13 and 14 provide breakdowns of the positions that the Coali-
tion and Labor staffers and bureaucrats occupied while in public office. 
Once again, many of them performed multiple roles. Policy advisors, 
party executives, media advisors and chiefs of staff figure prominently 
among the Coalition operatives who have moved between the fossil fuel 
sector and public office (Fig. 13). Of the 143 substantive positions 
documented, 121, or 85 percent of the total, were in one or more of these 
categories. The profiles of the Labor operatives are somewhat different, 
with chiefs of staff and policy advisors to ministers featuring the most 
Fig. 7. Federal & state ministers post-political employment as lobbyists, con-
sultants & board members for fossil-fuelled firms. 
Fig. 8. Eighteen fossil fuel companies and peak industry bodies for which former politicians filled board positions.  
Fig. 9. Nine lobbying firms with fossil energy clients & former politicians in their employ.  
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prominently, followed by media advisors to ministers and the executives 
of other government departments (Fig. 14). Of the 85 substantive po-
sitions identified, 61, or 72 percent of the total, were in one or more of 
these categories. Unsurprisingly, those with direct experience in the 
energy, resources, trade and industry portfolios figure prominently 
among all of these groups. Only a handful of the individuals concerned 
did not have some kind of direct experience in these portfolio areas. It 
should also be noted that all of the individuals in the ‘indeterminate’ 
Fig. 10. Political party allegiances of 119 ministerial staffers & senior bureaucrats employed by fossil fuel firms & peak industry bodies.  
Fig. 11. State, territory & federal jurisdictions in which 59 Coalition political staffers & senior bureaucrats served with employment links to the fossil fuel industry.  
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category served as senior bureaucrats for federal and/or state govern-
ment departments. All of them served in at least one of the aforemen-
tioned portfolio areas or a central policy and planning agency. 
Figs. 15–17 show the number of positions that ALP, Coalition and 
other staffers and senior bureaucrats occupied as lobbyists, consultants 
and/or industry employees.8 Fig. 15 correlates lobbying firms and 
consultancies with fossil energy clients and the number of positions held 
in those firms by current or former political staffers and senior bu-
reaucrats. Five of these firms stand out with five or more ex-political 
staffers working for them, four of which are bipartisan in their 
employment, but three of which favour the Coalition. Twelve of the 22 
companies represented only employed former Coalition staffers, and 
four employed only former Labor staffers, indicating their party political 
Fig. 12. State, territory & federal jurisdictions in which 37 Labor political staffers & senior bureaucrats served with employment links to the fossil fuel industry.  
Fig. 13. Official government positions held by Coalition staffers & senior bureaucrats with employment links to the fossil fuel industry.  
Fig. 14. Official government positions held by Labor staffers & senior bu-
reaucrats with employment links to the fossil fuel industry. 
8 Fourteen of the 91 Coalition and Labor staffers worked as journalists prior 
to working as staffers and in the fossil fuel and resource industries (15%). Most 
of the Coalition-linked journalists worked for the Murdoch-controlled outlets, 
while most of the ALP-linked journalists worked for the Fairfax Group. 
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affiliations. Only two of the 28 former senior bureaucrats of indeter-
minate political affiliations worked for lobbyists or consultancies. 
Fig. 16 documents fossil-fuelled firms and the number of positions 
held by current or former political staffers and senior bureaucrats. 
Almost all of the biggest employees in this instance are companies 
heavily invested in the gas industry, i.e. AGL, BHP Petroleum/BHP 
Billiton, British Gas/BG Group, Origin Energy, Queensland Gas Com-
pany, Santos and Shell Australia. Given that the period from 2007 to the 
present has seen the largest and most rapid historic expansion in the 
industry (Fig. 2), clearly all of these firms were ensuring they had ample 
inside knowledge and connections to government. 
Fig. 17 documents fossil-fuelled industry peak bodies and the 
Fig. 15. Lobbying firms & consultancies with fossil energy clients & number of positions held by current or former political staffers & senior bureaucrats.  
Fig. 16. Fossil-fuelled firms & number of positions held by current or former political staffers & senior bureaucrats.  
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Fig. 18. Total no. of positions in lobbying firms & consultancies occupied by current & former politicians, staffers & senior bureaucrats.  
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Fig. 19. Total no. of positions in fossil-fuelled firms occupied by current & former politicians, staffers & senior bureaucrats.  
Fig. 20. Total no. of positions in peak industry bodies occupied by current & former politicians, staffers & senior bureaucrats.  
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number of positions held by current or former political staffers and se-
nior bureaucrats. Three industry peak bodies, APPEA, the Minerals 
Council of Australia and the NSW Minerals Council have been clearly 
preoccupied with employing individuals from all three groups (i.e. the 
Coalition, ALP and indeterminate), with the Coalition clearly favoured 
in each case. APPEA appears to have seen an additional advantage in 
employing nine former senior industry bureaucrats. 
Figs. 18–20 collate all of the information contained in both databases 
for all individuals and relationships recorded. Fig. 18 collates all of the 
data on lobbying firms and consultancies. It shows that the vast majority 
of the 79 positions filled by these individuals were concentrated in half a 
dozen companies, all of which were founded by former senior politicians 
from the ALP and Coalition. Fig. 19 compiles all the employment data 
for fossil-fuelled firms. It clearly demonstrates that the largest number of 
former senior politicians, staffers and bureaucrats have been employed 
by major players in the rapidly expanding gas industry. In descending 
order, these are Santos, Shell Australia, AGL, Queensland Gas Company, 
BHP Billiton and British Gas/BG Group. Fig. 20 compiles all the data for 
industry peak bodies. Once again, three major players stand out: APPEA, 
the NSW Minerals Council and the Minerals Council of Australia, all of 
which are well-documented to promote climate change denial and 
disinformation concerning the relative merits of renewable energy and 
action on climate change. Readers who are interested in learning the 
details concerning the quantity and timing of lobbying expenditure by 
these peak industry bodies, as well as the timing and quantity of dona-
tions flowing from the fossil fuel and resource industries to the ALP and 
Coalition, are directed to Hanna Aulby’s research for TAI and the Centre 
for Public Integrity. Aulby’s research clearly demonstrates that all the 
peak industry bodies ramped up their activities and expenditure 
following the federal election of the ALP between 2009 and 2013. They 
all vigorously campaigned against Labor’s relatively modest climate 
change and renewable energy policies, and again ramped up their ac-
tivities and expenditure when Liberal PM Malcolm Turnbull proved 
insufficiently compliant to their interests [191,192]. 
Figs. 21 and 22 are social network diagrams of some of the re-
lationships documented in the two databases which have been rendered 
with Gephi open source software. Fig. 21 illustrates the covert gas 
industry network, illustrating the employment relationships between 
the Coalition (Liberals, Nationals, LNP) and ALP, and prominent players 
in the industry, including Santos, APPEA, AGL, the Queensland Gas 
Company/BG Group, Woodside, Origin Energy, the Gasfields Commis-
sion and the Australian Gas Industry Trust. The size of each node in-
dicates the number of connections to other entities and individuals. The 
red arrows indicate the strength of the relationships between the three 
main political groupings (Liberals, ALP, unknown) and the individuals 
linked to gas industry entities. It is clear from this diagram that the ALP, 
APPEA and Santos are the dominant political players in this network. 
This is borne out by the levels of political donations flowing to the ALP 
from the gas industry, as documented in Figs. 23–25. 
Fig. 22 illustrates the employment relationships between dominant 
industry players in coal, oil and gas and associated politicians, staffers 
and senior bureaucrats, together with the latter groups’ political affili-
ations. When these relationships are aggregated, the Liberals are un-
doubtedly the most prominent players in the network, closely followed 
by the ALP, APPEA, Santos, the Minerals Council of Australia and the 
NSW Minerals Council. AGL, Shell, QGC/BG Group and Rio Tinto are 
other major players. Once again, the blue arrows indicate the strength of 
the relationships between the three main political groupings (Liberals, 
ALP, unknown) and the individuals linked to fossil industry entities. All 
of these observations are confirmed by the data contained in the pre-
viously analysed charts. 
Four of the top ten fossil fuel political donors in Australia between 
2015 and 2019, i.e. Woodside, Santos, Chevron and Origin Energy 
(Figs. 23–25) figure prominently in the previous analysis. It is no coin-
cidence that they are also among the top tax avoiders in the resource and 
energy industries, bearing in mind that the top tax payers in both sectors 
only paid on average 5 percent of their total revenue in income tax over 
this four year period. Woodside paid 5.5 percent on its $21.8 billion in 
total revenue, Santos paid 0.02 percent on its $14.9 billion in total 
revenue, and Chevron paid zero income tax on $10.5 billion in total 
Fig. 21. Gas industry network with APPEA & political parties.  
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revenue. Last financial year, Origin Energy also paid zero income tax on 
its disclosed $7.2 billion revenue with project partners ConocoPhillips 
and Sinopec.9 Santos likewise paid zero income tax last financial year on 
$4.3 billion in total revenue, as did Woodside with $8.2 billion total 
revenue and $2 billion in taxable income. Two of Shell’s subsidiaries, 
QGC Upstream Holdings and Shell Upstream Holdings also paid zero 
income tax on $4 billion and $5.5 billion respectively [193]. 
All of these companies are dominant players in Australia’s gas in-
dustry cartel – together they donated more than $2.4 million to the 
Coalition and ALP, while two other major donors, i.e. Bluescope Steel 
and Mineral Resources, are major consumers of gas. The period covered 
by these tax figures encompass two federal elections and several state 
and territory elections. Between 2015 and 2019, Woodside donated 
more than $1 million and Santos around $570,000 (Fig. 23), most of 
which went to the ALP (Figs. 24 and 25). The ALP currently controls 
most of the sub-national governments holding major gas resources in 
Australia, i.e. Queensland, WA and the NT [194]. Given the generous 
political donations which the ALP has received from Woodside, Santos 
and other major gas producers and consumers over the last several years, 
and the extent to which it has successfully courted former Labor poli-
ticians and staffers, it is perhaps unsurprising that it remains supportive 
of the expansion of the gas industry in Australia and has shown no 
preparedness to demand they pay more income tax. 
The clear preference for the ALP in the level of donations from 
Santos, Chevron and Origin for the period 2015 to 2019 is captured by 
recent research published by the Australian Conservation Foundation 
(ACF), which also shows that the coal industry’s preferred donation 
recipient over the same period was the Liberal Party [194] (Figs. 23–25). 
What is most alarming about the lack of regulation of federal political 
donations, however, is the fact that more than half of the private in-
comes of the Liberal and Labor parties during the 2013 election could 
not be traced [195], while more than $100 million flowed to them from 
anonymous donors in the 2018–19 financial year during which the most 
recent federal election was held. Federal political donation laws are so 
inadequate that the sources of more than $1 billion in undisclosed in-
come to the major parties since 1999 cannot be traced [196]. It is highly 
likely, therefore, given the revenues and wealth of the fossil fuel and 
resource extraction industries, that a significant proportion of this ‘dark 
money’ has come from these industries, ensuring their structural power 
to determine the parameters of government policy is maintained, and 
the sources of their power remain hidden from the public. 
All of these data confirm the role of dominant capital in not only 
shaping, but controlling the way in which energy and climate policy has 
Fig. 22. Peak fossil industry network & political affiliations.  
9 ConocoPhillips is also the beneficiary of the helium and gas concessions 
provided by the Howard Government in the Timor Gap negotiations, which are 
the subject of ongoing legal challenges and corruption allegations [207]. 
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developed in Australia over the last fifteen years. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to imagine more compelling data regarding that role in these 
two crucial areas of government policy. The gas industry has focused on 
the ALP, and the coal industry on the Coalition, a fact which is further 
supported by the kind of industry-friendly rhetoric senior politicians 
from both parties have publicly espoused for well over a decade. Both 
the ALP and Coalition have demonstrated their support for the oil in-
dustry by enabling it to continue to pay little or no income tax on new 
and existing oil and gas projects, and by failing to act on the majority of 
the issues identified in Table 5 which directly benefit the industry’s 
market capitalization. 
The evidence presented supports all of the theories outlined in 
Section 3, i.e. economic-elite domination, biased pluralism, capital as 
power (CaP) and para-politics. This conclusion is virtually inescapable if 
we compare this evidence to the core assumptions pertaining to each of 
these theoretical approaches. 
The breadth and depth of the strategies identified above and the 
extraordinarily favourable economic and political outcomes they appear 
to have produced provide prima facie evidence for corporate state 
capture of Australian governments by the fossil fuel industry. The in-
terests of corporations, business associations and professional groups 
with interests in preserving the status quo on energy and climate policy 
in Australia have consistently predominated over those of the ‘average 
citizen’ and mass-based interest groups. The majority of the indicators of 
Fig. 23. Top 10 fossil fuel political donors in Australia, 2015–19. Source: Australian Electoral Commission/Australian Conservation Foundation.  
Fig. 24. Top 10 fossil fuel political donors & donees in Australia, 2016–17. Source: Australian Electoral Commission/Australian Conservation Foundation.  
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corporate state capture identified in Table 5 have low public visibility, 
and the scope of conflict associated with them is largely restricted to a 
handful of environmental and social justice advocacy groups and their 
supporters in academia and civil society. These findings are consistent 
with economic-elite domination theory and biased pluralism. 
Figs. 3–22 document the extent to which the social power networks 
occupied by the fossil fuel and resource extraction industries extend into 
and connect with the major political parties and key bureaucracies, ju-
risdictions and portfolio areas. These findings clearly support economic- 
elite domination theories by documenting how individuals with high 
social status occupying key institutional positions in government, busi-
ness and industry share common interests, backgrounds and social 
networks. This evidence also clearly supports CaP, because it demon-
strates that economic elites in the fossil fuel and resource extraction 
industries have used their corporations’ high levels of financialization 
and assetization to work through foundations, think-tanks, lobbying 
firms and other ‘opinion-shaping apparatus’ such as the Murdoch media 
to dominate government decision-making. This also constitutes clear 
evidence of biased pluralism, because a small corporate elite, primarily 
headquartered in the United States, has been able to consistently side-
line democratic electoral processes and the wishes of the majority of 
Australians, who have repeatedly expressed their preference to rapidly 
decarbonise and reduce carbon emissions. 
The structural power of dominant corporations in the electricity, 
coal, gas and oil industries and their peak industry bodies is exercised 
covertly through their control of the economic, political and policy 
agendas deemed legitimate by Australian governments. Their ability to 
structure these agendas to their political and economic advantage is 
achieved instrumentally over the major political parties through various 
forms of coercion via lobbying, political donations and the inside in-
formation obtained by revolving door operatives. All of these activities 
bias government decision-making to heavily favour corporate interests 
and therefore support the research of theorists of biased pluralism and 
economic-elite domination. 
Para-political behaviour, or Machiavellian forms of sabotage, are 
common strategies for all of these entities and the individuals who serve 
them. When outright coercion following the instrumental power 
playbook has proven ineffectual, sabotage of existing or proposed pol-
icies is then pursued, as we have seen in Australia in relation to emis-
sions trading, carbon pricing, the Solar Flagships Program, and many 
other progressive policy initiatives relating to energy and climate 
change in Australia. The ability of dominant capital to incapacitate or 
sabotage is a central feature of its power to control industrial develop-
ment according to CaP. 
All of the evidence canvassed above demonstrates the existence of 
structural biases in the institutions of government and various forms of 
‘soft corruption’. These findings complement those of researchers on the 
climate change counter-movement in North America [13–15,17–28], 
and of UK researchers on deep incumbency [29–33]. Consequently, if 
social scientists are serious in their commitment to understanding why 
such preferences find such consistent political expression, the method-
ological and theoretical toolkits we deploy cannot rely solely on the 
productive power of ideologies [146–148] or discourses [35,36] to 
explain these phenomena. 
6. Conclusion 
Australia has repeatedly been singled out as an international laggard 
on climate change and energy policy in multiple international fora over 
the last several years [7,95,197–201]. This paper has attempted to 
demonstrate that Australia’s poor overall performance on climate 
change and energy policy can be directly attributed to the pervasive 
influence of the fossil fuel and resource extraction industries on Aus-
tralia’s three incumbent political parties. A wide range of overt and 
covert strategies are routinely deployed by these industries to bolster 
their influence, which has resulted in at least twenty-four areas of 
government policy relevant to the decarbonisation of Australian society 
being stalled or prevented from being implemented. Because the full 
spectrum of strategies used by these industries are not revealed by 
discursive analytic methods, the main focus has been on outlining the 
kinds of critically reflexive scholarship and investigative techniques 
which can reveal the nature of some of the less well-documented stra-
tegies and how they are pursued. 
This paper clearly reveals that many tens of billions of dollars are 
Fig. 25. Top 10 fossil fuel political donors & donees in Australia, 2017–18. Source: Australian Electoral Commission/Australian Conservation Foundation.  
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being siphoned out of public coffers every year by highly profitable 
resource and fossil energy industries through direct subsidies, tax con-
cessions, and favourable policy decisions, even when the many billions 
of dollars in externalities which both industries cost Australia every year 
are disregarded. During a period in which austerity measures are being 
reintroduced under COVID, and governments complain they have 
insufficient financial resources to meet the challenges ahead, the 
reluctance of Australian governments to curb the ability of these in-
dustries to extract more wealth than is due to them makes these com-
plaints seem hollow. 
The evidence presented in this paper arguably constitutes a prima 
facie case for the corporate capture of the country’s major political 
parties with respect to the fossil fuel and resource extraction industries. 
Theories of economic-elite domination, biased pluralism, para-politics 
and capital as power provide crucial insights into how a wealthy 
country like Australia with a strong tradition of liberal democracy can be 
hijacked by such powerful interests. The hard won democratic reforms 
of previous generations are being systematically dismantled at the very 
time we need them as a foundation upon which to build further reforms, 
and in particular, to accelerate the construction of the low and zero 
carbon infrastructure that will enable nation states to create millions of 
new jobs, radically reduce their emissions, and create safer and cleaner 
environments for all. 
Due to considerations of length, this paper has not canvassed the 
kinds of policy reforms required to curb these activities. Readers are 
therefore directed to other research which does discuss some of the 
available options in detail [79,173,189–192,194–196,202–207]. It 
should nevertheless be clear from the preceding analysis that focusing 
upon issues such as corporate tax avoidance, post-public-service 
employment, government accountability, freedom of information, and 
political lobbying and donations are more likely to bring about better 
outcomes on climate change and energy policy than a continuing focus 
on the specific policy levers which have traditionally received the most 
attention from campaigners and reformers. It is my hope that if we as 
citizens can better identify the individuals occupying networks of covert 
influence across multiple portfolio areas within our governments, and 
for which firms and industries they are working, we are arguably going 
to be more successful at curbing their influence by raising public 
awareness of such activities, and crafting appropriate cases for regula-
tory and legal reform. 
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